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Regulating Occupations:
Quality or Monopoly?
This article highlights some of the findings in
the author’s new book, Licensing Occupations:
Ensuring Quality or Restricting Competition?
which is available from the Upjohn Institute
(see p. 7).

T

he licensing of occupations often
is accused of being stealth regulation
that operates under the public policy
radar screen. Unlike other labor market
institutions, such as laws regulating
unions or the minimum wage, the
regulation of occupations has received
little attention by the press, academics,
or policymakers. However, this lack of
attention is not because occupational
licensing is diminishing in the labor
market. Figure 1 shows that the growth
of occupational licensing in the United
States has increased far more than unions,
a more widely studied labor market
institution. Since the 1950s, licensing
coverage has grown from about 5 percent
of the workforce to more than 20 percent,
while unions have declined from about
a third of the workforce to less than 13
percent, and to fewer than 8 percent in
the private sector. Approximately 50
occupations are licensed in all states,
and about 800 occupations are similarly
regulated in at least one state.
Occupational regulation has varying
levels of stringency. The toughest form of
regulation is licensure, where it is illegal
for a person to practice a profession
without first meeting state standards,
which usually involve detailed education
requirements, testimonials of “good

moral character,” and a test. A second,
less restrictive form of regulation is
certification, which gives states a “rightto-title” protection for persons meeting
predetermined standards. Those without
certification may perform the duties
of the occupation but may not use the
title. A third and least restrictive form of
Figure 1 Comparisons in the Trends
of Two Labor Market Institutions:
Licensing and Unionization
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SOURCE: Tabulations for licensing coverage
for the 1950s are from the Council of State
Governments (1952), which lists licensed
occupations in the public use Census Sample
for 1950. For the 1960s, the tabulations are
from Greene (1969), which links the available
listing of licensed occupations to census
tabulations. The data for the 1980s are from
Kleiner (1990) tabulations; new estimates
were developed for 2000. Estimates for
union density are from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (1979) and Hirsch and Macpherson
(2005).
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regulation is registration, which usually
requires individuals to file their names,
addresses, and qualifications with a
government agency before practicing
in the occupation. Registration often
includes posting a bond or filing a fee.
Although the regulation of individuals
in occupations dates to ancient times, the
guilds of medieval Europe are most often
mentioned as examples of the imposition
of tough restrictions on entering a craft or
occupation. In the United States through
much of the nineteenth century, few
restrictions were imposed on occupations
we often think of as licensed, such as
doctors and lawyers. During the past
50 years, however, with the increase
in complexity of jobs, especially in the
service sector, licensing of individuals in
their jobs emerged as one of the fastestgrowing labor market institutions in the
United States and other industrialized
nations.
One of the major justifications for
occupational licensing is that it increases
service quality. Yet the available studies
offer little evidence that licensing
individuals has an impact on the quality
of service received by consumers. For
example, my examination of data from
Wisconsin and Minnesota finds no
evidence of differences in consumer
complaints between Wisconsin, which
licensed certain health care occupations,
such as physical therapists, respiratory
care providers, and physician assistants,
and complaints to state boards in
Minnesota, which certified the same
occupations.
Malpractice insurance premiums
can also serve as the arbitrator of the
effectiveness of licensing as a way to
mitigate the harmful effects of inept
practitioners. If licensing works as
intended, it should reduce mistakes
by licensed relative to unlicensed
practitioners. The insurance industry
would then provide lower premiums
for practitioners in regulated states
because licensing statutes (such as testing
and background checks) would have
weeded out incompetent or unscrupulous
practitioners. However, my examination
of the rates charged nationally for
practitioners who are licensed in some
U.S. states and not in others reveals
that no price breaks on malpractice
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Table 1 Key Findings of the Impact of Licensing on Enhancing Quality or
Restricting Competition
Issue

Key findings

Estimate of percent
Using Department of Labor and Census Data, percent of workforce
of workforce covered covered by licensing is approximately 20 percent, a growth of 11 percent
by licensing
over the past 15 years.
Potential benefits of
licensing

Increased standardization of services and reduction in the potential
“loss aversion” by consumers due to poor quality service.

Evidence of the
benefits of licensing

Some evidence that the insured and higher-income gain from stricter
licensing but no measurable impact on overall quality.

Price and wage
effects of licensing

Licensing drives up prices, and the overall wage effect relative to
unlicensed occupations in cross-section data is 10–12 percent, but
impacts differ widely based on methods, occupations, and toughness of
restrictions.

Licensing and
employment growth

Within an occupation, the percentage employment growth rate is
approximately 20 percent greater in states that do not require licensing,
but impacts differ widely based on the methods and occupations.

State variations in
licensing

Much variation in the number of occupations licensed by states and the
percent of the workforce covered by licensing laws. Case studies show
that political spending by the occupational associations is an important
factor for who gets regulated.

Redistribution and
lost output due to
licensing

Estimated redistribution effects to regulated occupations of between
$116 billion and $139 billion in 2000 dollars, and lost output of $34.8
and $41.7 billion per year, which is less than 0.1 percent of total
consumption expenditures.

U.S. and EU
comparisons

Both economies regulate entry but there is often no exam beyond
university or trade school to obtain a license for many of the professions
in the EU. EU nations regulate prices charged and the organizational
structure of the professions to a greater extent than the United States.
Wage effects for licensing are around 1 percent using cross-section
estimates, but the impacts vary widely based on methods, occupations,
and toughness of restrictions.

in insurance premiums were given to
practitioners in licensed states.
Then what are the potential impacts
of licensing? Restricting labor supply is
one. For example, there was a decline
in employment growth for librarians,
respiratory therapists, and dietitians and
nutritionists from 1990 to 2000 in those
states that regulate these occupations
relative those that do not. The estimates
using census data show that, for the
licensed occupations that were regulated
in about one-half of all states, licensing
reduced the percentage growth rate of
employment by a statistically significant
20 percent. Therefore, it is not surprising
that the impact of licensing on hourly
earnings compared to similar unlicensed
occupations was about 10–17 percent,
depending on the occupations and the
methods used in the analysis.
There is considerable variation among
the states in the number of occupations
licensed and in the percentage of the

workforce that is covered by licensing
laws. For example, California licenses
almost 180 occupations that cover more
than 30 percent of its workforce. On
the other hand, Kansas licenses about
50 occupations, and these regulatory
laws cover less than 12 percent of
its workforce. If licensing has no
productivity impacts yet increases
spending, then simulations of the net
expenses of the labor market regulation
indicate it costs the economy about $38
billion in lost service output per year.
The regulation of occupations in
Europe takes a somewhat different form
from that in the United States. Rather
than focusing on postgraduation tests,
countries such as France, Germany, and
the United Kingdom tend to regulate the
prices charged and the organizational
structure that is allowed by practitioners.
With the smaller differences in the
wage structure in Europe and the way
occupations are licensed, the overall
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impact of licensing on hourly wages is
much smaller than in the United States.
The major empirical findings in
Licensing Occupations are summarized
in Table 1. Given these results of the
labor market impacts of licensing,
other forms of regulation, such as
certification, are suggested. Alternative
forms of occupational regulation may
provide consumers with more choice
than licensing and reduce the potential
monopoly impacts of licensing in the
labor market. In order to better monitor
the economic impacts of licensing, data
on this form of regulation should be
provided to academics and policymakers
in the major national labor market data
sources, such as the Current Population
Survey. With more data and analysis,
the public, workers, and policymakers
can more accurately assess whether
occupational licensing is ensuring quality
or restricting competition.
Morris M. Kleiner is a professor at the
Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs and the
Industrial Relations Center at the University
of Minnesota–Twin Cities.
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Employment and Wage
Effects of Privatization
Evidence from Transition Economies

T

he greatest opposition to
privatizing a firm usually comes from the
firm’s own employees, who are fearful
of wage cuts and job losses. Workers’
apprehensions about privatization are
consistent with standard economic
analyses, whereby new private owners
reduce the firm’s labor costs in response
to harder budget constraints and stronger
profit-related incentives. Discussions of
this “efficiency effect” of privatization,
however, implicitly assume that the
firm’s output remains constant or at
least does not increase. But lower costs
may increase the firm’s market share as
well as total quantity demanded for the
industry, and the new private owners may
be more entrepreneurial in marketing,
innovation, and entering new markets. In
such cases, the firm’s output will tend to
rise, and if this “scale effect” dominates,
then privatization could cause a net
employment increase.
The implications of privatization
for wages are also ambiguous. New
owners may reduce wages as part of
a general cost-cutting policy, but if
the firm expands, it may have to offer
higher wages to attract new workers.
New private owners may also be more
likely to adopt skill-biased technologies,
resulting in a compositional shift toward
higher-paid workers. Depending on the
relative strength of such factors, wages
may either rise or fall as a result of
privatization.
Not only does theoretical analysis
fail to provide definitive predictions
on the wage and employment effects
of privatization, but also the existing
empirical evidence is both scant and
inconclusive, containing both negative
and positive estimates of the effects on
workers. Therefore, the Upjohn Institute,
in collaboration with partners from
Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh
and the Central European University

Labor Project in Budapest, has recently
undertaken an empirical analysis of
the effects of privatization on the wage
bill, employment, and wage rates of
firms in Hungary, Romania, Russia, and
Ukraine—countries where thousands of
businesses were privatized in a relatively
short period of time during the 1990s.
These four countries had varied success
with privatization reforms. Hungary was
considered one of the most successful,
Russia and Ukraine were less successful,
and Romania was somewhere in the
middle.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of
the average real wage bill and percent
private ownership in each country. At
this aggregate level of analysis, a strong
negative correlation is evident in all
four countries, which would seem to
corroborate workers’ fears and most
economists’ expectations. However,
several other events that could affect
the wage bill occurred during the 1990s
(including macroeconomic shocks and
market liberalization), and the firms
selected for privatization may have been
declining for extraneous reasons. To
deal with these potentially confounding
factors and estimate the causal effects
of privatization on workers, the project
has analyzed microdata on firms that
have been linked over time. The methods
applied to estimate the privatization
effects at the firm level draw upon some
of those used in evaluations of labor
market training programs in the United
States.
Privatization Programs and
Implications for Workers
The methods and tempos of large
enterprise privatization differed quite
significantly across the four countries in
this study. Hungary got off to an early
start in ownership transformation and
maintained a consistent case-by-case



